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Abstract: 
Although discrete choice models are well suited to describing the demand 
structure of differentiated goods, two important problems remain unsolved in their 
application. First, the total demand for a choice set is exogenously fixed. Second, 
multiple categories of goods cannot be handled in an unrestrictive way. In this 
paper, we address these flaws by formulating a complete utility maximization 
problem that is consistent with discrete choice models and derive the implications 
for applied research. We then apply the results to the ketchup and mayonnaise 
markets and investigate the differences arising from the consideration of multiple 
categories of goods. 
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1. Introduction 
 Discrete choice models are well suited to describing the demand structure of 
differentiated goods. However, two important problems remain unsolved. First, 
the total demand for a choice set is exogenously fixed. For instance, consider the 
choice of ketchup brands A and B. In conventional discrete choice models, given 
the assumption that a consumer selects only one alternative, a consumer selects 
“brand A,” “brand B,” or “no purchase”. Such a model can then readily handle a 
change in the demand for each brand of ketchup, but provides no explanation as 
to why a consumer selects only one alternative. This is a serious flaw of discrete 
choice models. In fact, McFadden (1999: p. 273) and Nevo (2000: fn. 14; 2001: fn. 
13, 2011) have repeatedly pointed out this limitation.3 This problem is especially 
serious given the application of discrete choice models to daily consumables, 
including ready-to-eat cereal (Nevo, 2001) and canned tuna (Nevo and 
Hatzitaskos, 2006), whose demand is more variable than that for durable goods 
such as housing (Earnhart, 2002) and automobiles (Berry et al., 1995; Goldberg, 
1995; Petrin, 2002). 
 Second, conventional discrete choice models have a limited ability to describe 
the unrestricted substitutionary or complementary relationship between goods. In 
relation to the first abovementioned flaw of discrete choice models, each 
                                                 
3 Nevo (2001: fn. 13) states: “A comment is in place about the realism of the assumption that 
consumers choose no more than one brand. Many households buy more than one brand of 
cereal in each supermarket trip but most people consume only one brand of cereal at a time, 
which is the relevant fact for this modeling assumption. Nevertheless, if one is still unwilling 
to accept that this is a negligible phenomenon, this model can be viewed as an approximation 
to the true choice model.” Nevo (2000: fn. 14, 2011) makes a similar point. McFadden (1999: 
p. 273) likewise raises the possibility that an alternative can be interpreted “…as a ‘portfolio’ 
of decisions made in sequence, or as one of the multiple decisions.” 
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alternative is necessarily a substitute because of assumed unitary choice. This 
substitutionary relationship between alternatives continues to hold for the case of 
multiple categories of goods.4 For example, while the nested logit model is 
capable of representing multiple categories of goods, it has some limitations: i) 
the relationship between each category is the logit, and ii) the total demand for a 
choice set is unity. In reality, a consumer may consume multiple units of multiple 
brands of multiple categories. For instance, one unit of brand A ketchup, two units 
of brand B ketchup, two units of brand C mayonnaise, and one unit of brand D 
mayonnaise. Accordingly, a decrease in the price of brand A ketchup would affect 
the demand for brands C and D mayonnaise, as well as the demand for brands A 
and B ketchup, and therefore change the total demand for both ketchup and 
mayonnaise. However, standard discrete choice models cannot generally represent 
such a relationship. 
 The purpose of this paper is to: i) develop a model resolving these flaws of 
discrete choice models, ii) examine the properties the derived model implies, and 
iii) apply the model to an actual situation in which a consumer selects many goods 
from multiple categories. First, we formulate the consumer’s deterministic utility 
maximization problem, which yields a consistent result with the discrete choice 
models. In other words, we reformulate the discrete choice models using a 
standard deterministic utility maximization framework to allow for a more general 
                                                 
4 Gentzkow (2007) analyzes the complementary relationship between the paper and online 
versions of a newspaper by including the choice of “buying both paper and online versions of 
newspaper.” In this setup, each alternative is a substitute, but the paper version and the online 
version of the newspaper can be complementary. This also implies that the maximum demand 
for the newspaper is unity. However, while the assumption of unitary demand may appear 
innocuous with a newspaper, we cannot generally extend this to other goods where the 
consumer can purchase multiple units. 
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demand structure between the various categories of goods. We begin our analysis 
using a simple logit model, but then extend it to more general discrete choice 
models, such as the generalized extreme value (GEV) and mixed logit models.5 
 Second, we derive the elasticities of the demand functions implied by our 
model and the method for the calculation of welfare change. We can decompose 
these elasticities into the elasticities for each category of goods and those of the 
choice probability. The former contribute to describing the complementary 
relationship between goods, even though they are disregarded in conventional 
discrete choice models of unitary demand for a choice set. For the calculation of 
welfare change, we extend the results in Small and Rosen (1981) to allow for the 
variable total demand of goods and multiple categories of goods. 
 Finally, to illustrate the application of our analysis, we estimate the demand 
functions for the ketchup and mayonnaise markets, examine their characteristics, 
and calculate the welfare change under a hypothetical scenario using point-of-sale 
(POS) data from supermarket checkouts. The estimated results suggest that the 
goods in both markets are complementary and not well represented by 
conventional discrete choice models designed for a single category of goods with 
fixed unitary demand for a choice set. 
 Before proceeding, we briefly relate our paper to the broader literature. First, 
the analysis in this paper relates to Anderson et al. (1988, 1992: Ch. 3) and 
Verboven (1996), both of which formulate a utility maximization problem 
consistent with discrete choice models. The former derives a direct utility function 
that corresponds to the logit model, whereas the latter does so for the nested logit 
model. Our theoretical analysis differs from these studies in two respects. The 
first is that our framework can incorporate multiple categories of goods, and 
                                                 
5 Our analysis is quite general, in that Dagsvik (1995) and McFadden and Train (2000) show 
that these models can approximate any random utility model. 
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accordingly, easily applies to empirical demand analyses, as we illustrate using 
actual ketchup and mayonnaise data. The second is that we formulate a utility 
maximization problem that corresponds to the GEV and mixed GEV models, 
which are more general models than the logit and nested logit models. 
 Second, our analysis also relates to the so-called “discrete/continuous” models 
in the literature, which enables us to select multiple goods within the framework 
of discrete choice models (Dubin and McFadden (1984), Hanemann (1984), 
Hendel (1999), Dube (2004), and Bhat (2005, 2008)). However, these studies do 
not consider multiple categories of goods. Importantly, the analysis in this paper 
can consider multiple categories of goods without assuming an a priori 
substitutionary or complementary relationship between categories. Song and 
Chintagunta (2007) and Mehta and Ma (2012) apply the approach in Hanemann 
(1984) to a choice across multiple categories of goods. However, in both of these 
analyses, each brand in a category is a perfect substitute, such that by assumption, 
the choice is of only one brand. Our analysis is free of this restriction in that a 
consumer may select as many brands as they like from within each category, and 
at the same time, may consume as many units of each brand as they like. 
 Third, an effective way to describe a system of demand is to apply the Almost 
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), 
whereby we consider AIDS as the first-order approximation of any demand model. 
The theoretical model derived in this paper is consistent with the demand models 
from logit, GEV, and mixed GEV models. Thus, our approach is of a narrower fit 
than AIDS from the viewpoint of functional form. However, this approach has a 
clear merit in that our model can better represent product differentiation with 
fewer parameters to estimate, and is more easily applied to actual data. 
Nonetheless, as with AIDS, our model can handle any number of categories, 
address arbitrary relationships between categories, and enable unrestricted choice 
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within a category (multiple choices of brands and multiple choices of the units of 
each brand). 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, as the 
simplest case, we formulate a utility maximization problem in which a consumer 
chooses goods from one category of differentiated goods, the result for which is 
consistent with the logit model. We then examine the elasticities of the derived 
demand functions and the corresponding method for welfare estimation. In 
Section 3, we generalize the analyses in Section 2 to accommodate multiple 
categories of differentiated goods, while maintaining focus on the logit model for 
a consumer. In Section 4, we consider an additional restriction reflecting the 
actual situation of multiple consumers. Section 5 extends our analysis to the GEV 
and mixed GEV models. Section 6 empirically applies our framework to an 
analysis of the markets for ketchup and mayonnaise. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. The logit model with flexible total choice for a single category 
 For simplicity, we begin by focusing on the simplest case in which a single 
consumer selects goods from one category of differentiated goods, with the 
selection results represented by the logit model. We consider the consumer’s 
“complete” utility maximization problem in which the consumer selects as many 
goods as they like without fixing the total demand for a choice set or including a 
“no purchase” alternative, and yet yields results consistent with the logit model. 
Note that a standard approach in discrete choice models considers “partial” utility 
maximization where, by assumption, the consumer selects only one alternative 
(including the “no purchase” alternative) given that the total demand for a choice 
set is fixed at unity. Appendix A lists the variables and parameters. 
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2.1. Indirect utility function 
 Our purpose here is to construct a utility maximization model, which yields a 
demand function for differentiated good j  that is consistent with the logit model 
(1) 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ,..., , ) ( ,..., , )j M g M j Mx p p y x p p y s p p y= , 
where 1( ,..., , )g Mx p p y  is the total demand for a category and 1( ,..., , )j Ms p p y  is 
the choice probability of the logit model. Thus, the demand function for 
differentiated good j , (1), has the form of the logit model, but endogenous total 
demand for a category. We place two assumptions on (1). The first is that the total 
demand for a category, gx , depends only on prices through the aggregated price 
index, 1( ,..., , )MP p p y . This property is useful for the actual estimation of the 
system of demand functions, where we can separate the total demand for a 
category and the choice probability. The second assumption is that the choice 
probability of differentiated good j  is a decreasing function of price. The 
conventional logit model satisfies this property. Under these two assumptions, (1) 
is modified to 
(2) 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ( ,..., , ), ) ( ,..., , )j M g M j Mx p p y x P p p y y s p p y= , 
where 0j
j
s
p
∂
<
∂
. 
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for the demand function for 
differentiated good j  to have the form of (2) is that the indirect utility function 
has the form of 
(3) 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ( ,..., , ), )M Mv p p y v P p p y y= , 
where 
(4) 1
1
( ,..., , ) exp( ( ) ( ) )
M
M j j
j
P p p y y y pα β′ ′
′=
≡ −∑  ( ( ) 0yβ > ). 
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 We easily check the sufficiency of this result using Roy’s identity. Applying 
Roy’s identity to (3), we have 
(5) 1
( )
( ( ,..., , ), )g M
vy P
Px P p p y y v
y
β ∂
∂=
∂
∂
 and 
(6) 1
1
exp( ( ) ( ) )
( ,..., , )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
j j
j M M
j j
j
y y p
s p p y
y y p
α β
α β′ ′
′=
−
=
−∑
, 
which are consistent with (2). In (5), the total demand for a category, 
1( ( ,..., , ), )g Mx P p p y y , is nonnegative from 0
j
v
p
∂
≤
∂
 and 0v
y
∂
>
∂
, which follow 
from the properties of the indirect utility function. We prove the necessity by 
solving the system of differential equations obtained from (2). See Appendix B 
for details. 
 Three points warrant further explanation. First, a consumer may consume as 
many goods as they like, because we include no assumption regarding the total 
demand for a choice set, contrary to the standard approach where it is fixed at 
unity. A consumer may also consume multiple brands of differentiated goods 
within the one category because the demand for differentiated good j  is the total 
demand for a category multiplied by the choice probability of good j . The case 
of a corner solution is included, such that when ( ) ( )j j jy y pα β−  approaches 
negative infinity, the choice probability of good j is zero. 
 Second, the argument for each exponential function in the aggregated price 
index, (4), must be: i) linear in price and ii) have the same coefficient for price, so 
that we derive the logit demand representation, (2), in which the total demand for 
a category depends only on the aggregated price index, (4). When the first 
condition is unmet, we cannot obtain the common total demand for a category, (5), 
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that is, the logit demand representation, (2), no longer holds. When the second 
condition is unmet, we lose the property that the total demand for a category, (5), 
depends only on the aggregated price index. 
 Third, we may be interested in the form of the direct utility function that 
corresponds to the indirect utility function, (3). Unfortunately, we cannot derive a 
direct utility function that perfectly corresponds to the indirect utility function, (3), 
in closed form. However, applying Anderson et al. (1988, 1992: Ch. 3), we can 
provide an example of the direct utility function: 
(7) 
1 1
1
1 ln
M M
j
j j jM
j j
j
j
xau z x x
x
ψ α
β β
′
′ ′ ′
′ ′= =
′
′=
  
      = + + −     
  
  
∑ ∑
∑
, 
where a  is a parameter and β  does not depend on y .6 This direct utility function 
yields the indirect utility function of 
(8) 1 1ln ln lnP P Pv y
a a a
ψ ψ ψ− −    ′ ′= − + − +    
    
, 
which is a special case of (3). 
 
2.2. Elasticities 
 We focus here on the properties of the demand functions by deriving the price 
elasticities. From (2), (5), and (6), the respective own- and cross-price elasticities 
are 
                                                 
6 Eq. (7) is a modified direct utility function of Eq. (3.26) in Anderson et al. (1992: Ch. 3). 
Their direct utility function is not completely consistent with the demand function for the 
logit model because the choice probability depends on the demand function for all 
differentiated goods. 
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(9) ( )(1 )j j j j j
j j
x p
y s p
p x
θ β
∂
= − −
∂
 
and 
(10) ( )j k k k k
k j
x p y s p
p x
θ β
∂
= +
∂
, 
where 1,...,k M= , k j≠ , and 1
1
( ( ,..., , ), )
( ( ,..., , ), )
g M j
j
j g M
x P p p y y p
p x P p p y y
θ
∂
≡
∂
 
is the price elasticity of the consumer’s total demand for a choice set. 
 In this regard, three points warrant explanation. First, the own- and cross-price 
elasticities have a common structure for the elasticity of the consumer’s total 
demand for a choice set plus that of the choice probability, as pointed out by 
Taplin (1982) and Oum et al. (1992) in the context of transport demand.7 In the 
ordinary logit model where the total demand for a choice set is fixed, we 
disregard the elasticity of total demand. Consequently, the elasticity derived is not 
the elasticity of demand, but rather the elasticity of the choice probability. Thus, it 
is highly probable that the elasticity derived in the logit model with fixed total 
demand for a choice set differs significantly from the true elasticity when the 
change in the total demand for a choice set is large. 
 Second, the cross-price elasticity of (10) demonstrates that the two 
differentiated goods can be gross complements as Anderson et al. (1992, Eq. 3.41) 
suggests, although they are necessarily gross substitutes when the total demand 
for a choice set is fixed.8 Recall that in the logit model with fixed total demand 
                                                 
7 In Taplin (1982) and Oum et al. (1992), the elasticity of the consumer’s total demand for the 
category of differentiated goods and that of the choice probability correspond to the elasticity 
of demand for aggregate traffic and the mode choice elasticity, respectively. 
8 See Mas-Colell et al. (1995: p. 70) for the definition of gross substitutes and complements. 
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for a choice set, a decrease in the price of brand A necessarily reduces the demand 
for brand B. That is, all differentiated goods must be gross substitutes. However, 
this relationship breaks down if we consider the change in total demand. In that 
case, a decrease in the price of brand A has the effect of increasing the total 
demand for a choice set as well as diverting demand from brand B to brand A. If 
the former effect outweighs the latter, the demand for brand B increases. 
 Third, the above two points suggest problems for a typical logit model with 
variable total demand, which makes the demand for each good variable by 
introducing a “no purchase” alternative within the fixed total demand for a choice 
set. One problem is that the share of the “no purchase” alternative tends to be very 
high, at least over a short period if, as Nevo (2001) suggests, the total demand for 
a choice set is fixed at the number of residents. This is because a consumer is less 
likely to purchase a category of goods when the period in question is shorter. This 
feature is stronger for more durable and expensive goods like cars and houses. In 
such a case, the share of each good relative to the number of residents becomes 
very small, which makes the own- and cross-price elasticities of choice 
probability, ( )(1 )j jy s pβ− −  and ( ) k ky s pβ  in (9) and (10), very large and very 
small, respectively. Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether the too-large 
share of the “no purchase” alternative will over- or underestimate the true 
elasticities because the true elasticities include the elasticities of the consumer’s 
total demand for a choice set, jθ  and kθ . The other point is that if the total 
demand for a category varies because of the “no purchase” alternative, the cross-
price elasticities are always positive because the elasticity of total demand for a 
choice set is zero. Accordingly, this setup is also unable to represent 
complementary relationships between differentiated goods. 
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2.3. Welfare analysis 
 We now consider the method for welfare analysis. Hereafter, the superscripts 
WO  and W  denote without and with policy. The indirect utility function, (3), is 
perfectly compatible with standard deterministic utility maximization. Thus, the 
compensating variation is the sum of the areas to the left of the compensated 
demand functions, as is usual. That is, the compensating variation, cv , can be 
calculated by 
(11) 
1
1
1
1
( ,..., , )
( ,..., , ) ,
WO
j
W
j
WO
j
W
j
WOMp jM
jp
j j j
Mp jc WO
j M jp
j j
pe p p vcv dp
p p
p
x p p v dp
p
′
′= ′
′
′
′=
 ∂∂
=   ∂ ∂ 
 ∂
=   ∂ 
∑∫
∑∫
 
where 1( ,..., , )Me p p v  is the expenditure function, which is derived from the 
indirect utility function of (3), and cjx  is the compensated demand function for 
good j .9 In (11), we consider the possibility that a change in the price of 
differentiated good j  affects the price of differentiated good j′ . 
 An interesting question is whether we can calculate the compensating variation 
only from the change in the aggregated price index, (4), utilizing the property that 
the total demand for a category depends solely on the aggregated price index. 
Generally, the aggregated price index is a function of income as well as prices, 
and thus we cannot represent the expenditure function as a function of the 
aggregated price index. This means that we generally cannot derive the 
compensating variation given the change in the aggregated price index. However, 
in a special case where the aggregated price index is independent of income, we 
                                                 
9 The same result applies to the equivalent variation ( ev ) if WOv  is substituted for Wv . 
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can calculate the compensating variation with the change in the aggregated price 
index. 
 Suppose that ( )j jyα α=  and ( )yβ β=  hold in the aggregated price index, (4), 
that is, 
(12) 1 1
1
( ,..., , ) ( ,..., ) exp( )
M
M M j j
j
P p p y P p p pα β′ ′
′=
= = −∑ . 
In this case, we obtain the compensated demand function for differentiated good 
j : 
(13) 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ( ,..., ), ) ( ,..., , )
c c
j M g M j Mx p p v x P p p v s p p y= , 
which has the form of the compensated total demand for a category multiplied by 
the choice probability. In (13), 
(14) ( ) 11
( ( ,..., ), )( ( ,..., ), ) 0
WO
c M
g M
e P p p vx P p p v P
P
β ∂= − ≥
∂
, 
where the nonnegativity of 1( ( ,..., ), )
c
g Mx P p p v  is derived from the properties of 
the indirect utility function of 0
j
v
p
∂
≤
∂
 and 0v
y
∂
>
∂
. 
 Under the assumption for (12), we have 
(15) 1
( ( ,..., ), )1 WO
W
c
P g M
P
x P p p v
cv dP
Pβ
 
= −  
 
∫ , 
which demonstrates that the compensating variation can be derived from the 
compensated total demand function for a category using the change in the 
aggregated price index. Moreover, if we define the log-sum variable as 
(16) 1 1
1
( ,..., , ) ln ( ,..., , ) ln exp( ( ) ( ) )
M
M M j j
j
LS p p y P p p y y y pα β′ ′
′=
≡ = −∑ , 
Eq. (15) is rewritten as 
(17) 1
1 ( ( ,..., ), )
WO
W
LS c
g MLS
cv x LS p p v dLS
β
= − ∫ . 
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This result is an extension of Small and Rosen (1981), which demonstrates that 
the compensating variation is the change in the log-sum term multiplied by fixed 
total demand with exogenously fixed total demand. The case of fixed total 
demand corresponds to a limiting case of (17) in which the total demand function 
is vertical. Although a standard interpretation of the log-sum term is as a measure 
of expected consumer surplus,10 (17) demonstrates that it is more accurately the 
aggregated price index, including the possibility of a change in the total demand 
for a choice set. 
 
3. The logit model with flexible total choice for multiple categories 
 Given the analysis in Section 2, it is now easy to formulate a utility 
maximization problem corresponding to a logit model including multiple 
categories of goods. In what follows, we provide the form of the corresponding 
indirect utility function, the elasticities, and the method for welfare estimation. 
 
3.1. Indirect utility function 
 Suppose that differentiated good j  in category h ( 1,...,h H= ) is represented 
by the demand function for category h , 1 1( ( , ),..., ( , ), )hg H Hx P y P y yp p , multiplied 
by the logit choice probability within category h , ( , )hj hs yp , that is,  
(18) 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ( , ),..., ( , ), ) ( , )hj M hg H H hj hx p p y x P y P y y s y= p p p , 
where hp  is the price vector for the differentiated goods in category h  and 
( , )h hP yp  is the aggregated price index for category h . As in Section 2, we 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Train (2009). Domencich and Macfadden (1975) and Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman (1985) respectively interpret the log-sum term as an inclusive value and the measure 
of accessibility in relation to transport demand modeling. 
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restrict our attention to the form of the total demand for category h  that depends 
only on the aggregated price indices for category h , ( , )h hP yp . 
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for the demand function for 
differentiated good j  to have the form of (18) is that the indirect utility function 
has the form of 
(19) 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ( , ),..., ( , ), )M H Hv p p y v P y P y y= p p , 
where 
(20) ( ) exp( ( ) ( ) )h h hk h hk
k h
P y y pα β
∈
≡ −∑p  ( ( ) 0h yβ > ). 
 For sufficiency, applying Roy’s identity to (19) is sufficient to derive 
(21) 1 1
( )
( ( , ),..., ( , ), ) 0
h h
h
hg H H
vy P
Px P y P y y v
y
β ∂
∂
= ≥
∂
∂
p p 11 and 
(22) 
exp( ( ) ( ) )
( , )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
hj h hj
hj h
hj h hj
j h
y y p
s y
y y p
α β
α β′ ′
′∈
−
=
−∑
p , 
which are consistent with (18). The proof of necessity is a simple extension of 
that in Section 2, and thus omitted. 
 The indirect utility function, (19), is an extension of (3), taking into account 
multiple categories of goods. Now that the total demand function for category h  
depends not only on the aggregated price index for category h  but also on those 
for any other categories in an unrestrictive way, we can represent any 
substitutionary or complementary relationships between the categories. This 
feature is a major advantage of our framework because, as we will see in Section 
                                                 
11 The nonnegativity of the total demand function for category h  follows from the properties 
of the indirect utility function, as in Section 2. 
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6, it enables us to analyze the relationship between categories without any 
premises. This contrasts with the standard analysis for multiple categories of 
goods using the nested logit model, for instance, in which the relationship 
between categories is restricted to the logit model. 
 
3.2. Elasticities 
 We summarize how we modify the results for the elasticities in Section 2.2. 
The differences from the elasticities in Section 2.2 are: i) the price elasticities of 
the total demand for category h  and the choice probability for the category within 
category h  differ by category, and ii) the cross-price elasticity for the goods 
within the same category differs from that across categories. 
 First, in terms of the own-price elasticity, we derive 
(23) (1 )hj hj hj h hj hj
hj hj
x p
s p
p x
θ β
∂
= − −
∂
, 
where 1 1
1 1
( ( , ),..., ( , ), )
( ( , ),..., ( , ), )
hg H H hj
hj
hj hg H H
x P y P y y p
p x P y P y y
θ
∂
≡
∂
p p
p p
. 
This is a natural extension of (9), taking into account multiple categories. Second, 
when differentiated goods j  and k  are in the same category, the cross-elasticity 
is 
(24) hj hk hk h hk hk
hk hj
x p s p
p x
θ β
∂
= +
∂
, 
which is the same as (10), except that the elasticity of the total demand for 
category h  and the choice probability within category h  differ by category. 
When the goods belong to different categories, that is, differentiated good j  
belongs to category h  and differentiated good k  belongs to category h′  
( 1,...,h H′ =  and h h′ ≠ ), the corresponding cross-price elasticity is 
17 
 
(25) hj h k hk
h k hj
x p
p x
θ′
′
∂
=
∂
, 
which shows that the cross-price elasticity depends only on the price elasticity of 
the total demand for category h . This is because the choice probability of a 
differentiated good depends only on the prices of differentiated goods within the 
same category, and is unaffected by the prices of goods in other categories. 
 As we can see from (24) and (25), we can unrestrictedly represent a variety of 
relationships between the multiple categories using the elasticity of the total 
demand for category h , hkθ . This feature stems from the fact that the total 
demand for category h , (21), depends on the aggregated price indices for all 
categories. 
 
3.3. Welfare analysis 
 Regarding the calculation of the consumer’s compensating variation, cv , we 
again obtain (11). This is because how we categorize the goods does not affect the 
method for welfare calculation if we analyze a change in welfare based on the 
compensated demand function for each good. 
 If the aggregate price index is independent of income, that is, if ( )k kyα α=  and 
( )h hyβ β= , the methods using the aggregated price indices and log-sum terms, 
(15) and (17), are modified to 
(26) 
( ) 1 1
( )
1
( ( ),..., ( ), ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
WO
h h
W
h h
c WOHP h g H H h h
h hP
h h h h h h
x P P v Pcv dP
P Pβ
′ ′ ′
′= ′ ′ ′
  ∂
= −   ∂  
∑∫
p
p
p p p p
p p
 and 
(27) 
( )
1 1( )
1
1 ( )( ( ),..., ( ), ) ( )
( )
WO
h h
W
h h
HLS c WO h h
h g H H h hLS
h h h h
LScv x LS LS v dLS
LSβ
′ ′
′
′=
  ∂
= −  ∂  
∑∫
p
p
pp p p
p
, 
where 
(28) ( ) ln ( ) ln exp( ( ) ( ) )h h h h hj h j
j h
LS P y y pα β′ ′
′∈
≡ ≡ −∑p p . 
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Eq. (27) is particularly useful in application, because it demonstrates the 
relationship between the log-sum terms and compensating variation in the case of 
multiple categories of goods. 
 
4. Aggregation among multiple consumers 
 We have thus far considered a single-consumer economy. However, most data 
are market data, which aggregate the behaviors of many heterogeneous 
individuals. In this section, we consider the application of our analysis to market 
data. 
 We need to aggregate the model from a single- to a multiple-consumer 
economy. As is well known, each consumer’s indirect utility function must take 
the Gorman form for consistent aggregation.12 That is, consumer i ’s indirect 
utility function has the form 
(29) 1 1 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ( ),..., ( )) ( ( ),..., ( ))
i i i i
M H H H Hv p p y A P P B P P y= +p p p p , 
where superscript i  denotes the index of a consumer. By aggregating (29) over i , 
the representative indirect utility function is 
(30) 1 1 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ( ),..., ( )) ( ( ),..., ( ))
i i i
M H H H H
i i
V v p p y A P P B P P Y= = +∑ ∑ p p p p , 
where 
i
Y y≡ ∑ . 
 The difference between the indirect utility function in a single-consumer 
economy, (19), and that in a multiple-consumer economy, (29), stems from the 
fact that the aggregated price index must be independent of income. This is 
necessary because the Gorman form requires that: i) the indirect utility function is 
linear in income, and ii) it has a common coefficient of income for all consumers. 
                                                 
12 See Varian (1992) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995) for an explanation of the Gorman form. 
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 The market demand function, which is derived from the indirect utility function 
of the representative consumer, (30), replaces the total demand for category h , 
1 1( ( , ),..., ( , ), )hg H Hx P y P y yp p  in (21), with the total market demand for category 
h . Accordingly, we replace the price elasticities of the total demand for 
categories with those of the total market demand for the categories in (23)–(25). 
 Because the aggregated price index is independent of income according to the 
requirements of the Gorman form, each consumer’s compensating variation can 
always be calculated using the aggregated price index or log-sum terms from (26) 
and (27). We then obtain the aggregated compensating variation by summing each 
consumer’s compensating variation. Alternatively, we can calculate the 
aggregated compensating variation from (11), (26), and (27) if we replace the 
compensated demand for good j  in (11), 1( ,..., , )
c WO
j Mx p p v′ , and the total 
compensated demand for category h  in (26) and (27), 1 1( ( ),..., ( ), )
c WO
h g H Hx P P v′ p p , 
with their market demand counterparts. 
 
5. Extensions to GEV and mixed logit models 
 We can generalize the analysis thus far to the GEV model and the mixed logit 
(or GEV) model. An important point to note is that while the GEV and mixed 
logit (or GEV) models can remove the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property, they are still incapable of describing the arbitrary relationship 
between multiple categories of goods if we retain the assumption of fixed total 
demand for a choice set. For instance, in the case of the nested logit model, which 
is a class of GEV model, the relationships between the multiple categories are 
limited to the logit model, and those within a category must be substitutes. In the 
mixed logit model, we can represent sophisticated substitutionary relationships 
free of IIA, but still cannot incorporate the complementary relationship between 
categories. Appendices C and D provide detailed analyses of the GEV and mixed 
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logit (or GEV) models. Here, we summarize the main differences to the logit 
model. 
 First, in the case of the GEV model, we modify the aggregated price indices, 
log-sum terms, choice probabilities, and elasticities to be consistent with the GEV 
model. The own- and cross-price elasticities are more complex, but retain the 
property that the elasticities have the form of the sum of the elasticity for the 
category and the elasticity for choice probability. Regarding welfare estimation, 
the results for the logit model continue to hold if we replace the aggregated price 
indices and log-sum terms in the logit model with those in the GEV model. 
 Second, in the mixed logit model, each consumer’s indirect utility function 
must take the quasilinear form, which is a special version of the Gorman form, for 
consistent aggregation in a multiple-consumer economy. This is because each 
consumer has different parameters, and therefore the aggregated price indices 
differ between consumers. The Gorman form indirect utility function requires that 
the coefficient of income is the same for all consumers, so it cannot include the 
aggregated price index as an argument, that is, it is a constant. This restriction 
implies that each consumer’s indirect utility function, and thus the aggregated 
indirect utility function, takes the quasilinear form. 
 
6. Application 
 In this section, we estimate a consumer demand model with multiple categories 
of goods using actual data and compare the results with those from the 
conventional logit model with the outside option of “no purchase.” Our aim is to 
shed light on the substitutionary or complementary relationships between 
categories of goods, which is not possible using the conventional logit model. 
Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we use the logit model, disregarding the IIA 
problem. 
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 The data are POS data collected by KSP-SP Co. Ltd from 686 Japanese 
supermarkets for ketchup and mayonnaise sold in December 2013. The data 
contain the sales price and quantity sold for each brand of ketchup and 
mayonnaise, the number of customers who pass through the checkout, and the 
prefecture where the store is located. 
 The reasons why we focus on ketchup and mayonnaise are as follows. First, 
both markets are oligopolistic and are well suited to analysis using the logit model. 
Selecting those brands with at least 3% of market share by revenue identifies six 
brands of ketchup and eight brands of mayonnaise, each group having 71% of 
market share by revenue in total. Appendix E lists the brands.13 Second, in Japan, 
it is less likely that ketchup is a substitute for mayonnaise, and vice versa. 
Intuitively, as they are not substitutes, they do not warrant analysis using the 
conventional logit model, so they are suited to an analysis using the framework 
developed in this paper, which allows for complementarity among categories of 
goods. In fact, as shown later, a good in ketchup and a good in mayonnaise are 
gross complements. 
 Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics, including various statistics for prices 
and quantities counting, for each brand, only those stores selling that brand.  The 
data exhibit two features. First, the number of markets differs significantly by 
brand. This reflects the fact that the product varieties of ketchup and mayonnaise 
that each store sells are quite different. Second, the unit market share of each 
brand becomes very small if our calculations include the outside option of “no 
purchase.” This is because the quantity sold per brand is very small relative to the 
total number of customers passing through the checkout. We exclude the data for 
four stores that do not sell any of the six brands of ketchup that are included in the 
                                                 
13 We treat different package sizes of a given product as separate goods. 
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study. Accordingly, the sample size is 682. We label ketchup as category 1 and 
mayonnaise as category 2. All estimations use Stata 11. 
 
6.1. Estimation of the two logit models – one category of goods with the outside 
option and two categories of goods without the outside option 
 
6.1.1. The logit model for one category of goods with the outside option 
 We begin by estimating the conventional logit model including the outside 
option. As usual in the literature, the utility of “no purchase” is normalized at zero. 
The demand for each brand is 
(31) 
exp( )
1 exp( )
r
hi h hjr r
hj r
hi h hj
j h
p
x N
p
α β
α β ′
′∈
−
=
+ −∑
, 
where 1,...,682r =  is the store number and 1,2h =  is the index for the category. 
When 1h = , i.e., the category is ketchup, 1,...,6j =  is the index for the brands of 
ketchup. In the same way, when 2h = , i.e., the category is mayonnaise, 
1,...,8j =  is the index for the brands of mayonnaise. rN  denotes the number of 
consumers who pass through the checkout at store r .  Our estimation procedure 
follows Berry (1994), who “linearizes” the logit model to consider the possibility 
of endogeneity. We define the number of “no purchase” for category h  at store r  
as 0
r
hx , which is calculated as the difference between the number of consumers 
who pass through the checkout at store r , rN , and the sum of quantities of 
category h  sold by store r , rhj
j
x∑ . Taking the natural log of the ratio of (31) to 
the number of “no purchase,” we have 
(32) 
0
log
r
hj r
hi h hjr
h
x
p
x
α β= −  
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for both ketchup and mayonnaise. 
 In estimating (32), we need to take into account the potential endogeneity of 
r
hjp . Given the limitations of our data, the only available instrument is the average 
price in other stores, as used in Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001). We then 
estimate (32) for ketchup and mayonnaise with ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
two-stage least squares (2SLS), respectively, using the average price in the other 
stores as the instrument. Table 2 shows the results. As can be seen, all the 
estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% level, regardless of whether the 
estimation method is OLS or 2SLS. The result for endogeneity is ambiguous. We 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the OLS and 2SLS 
coefficients for ketchup, but not for mayonnaise. One reason could be that the 
assumption of Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001) that the demand shocks are 
independent across stores might not hold here. This is because our data include 
several chain stores, where it is highly probable that promotions or advertisements 
are common to at least some portion of stores. This makes the assumption of 
independent demand shocks questionable, and therefore undermines the 
effectiveness of the instrument. 
 
6.1.2. The logit model for two categories of goods without the outside option 
 We then estimate the logit model that is compatible with multiple categories of 
goods. Our task is to estimate the market demand function for each good that 
corresponds to the indirect utility function of the representative consumer, (30). 
To do this, we need to specify the functional form of (30). Natural candidates are 
the translog and generalized Leontief functions, both of which are less restrictive 
and widely used in applied research. 
 The translog indirect utility function of the representative consumer does not 
have a realistic property in our model and is represented by 
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(33) 
2 2
1 1
1ln exp( ) ln exp( )
2
r r r r r
h hj h hj hj h hj
h j h h j h
V Y N a p b pα β α β′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′= ∈ = ∈
    
= + − + −    
     
∑ ∑ ∏ ∑ , 
which yields the market demand function of 
(34) 1 1 1
1
exp( )1 ln exp( )
2 exp( )
r
hj h hjr r r
hj h h h rh j h h j
j h hj h hj
j h
p
x N a b p
p
α β
β β α β
α β
− − −
−
′ ′
′ ′ ′∈
′∈
  −
= + −  − 
∑ ∑
. 
Eq. (34) demonstrates that the demand for one category of goods, that is, the sum 
of the demand for each good in one category, depends only on the aggregated 
price index of the other category. For example, the total demand for ketchup is 
determined not by the aggregated price index of ketchup but by that of 
mayonnaise. This is why we consider it unrealistic to assume that the indirect 
utility function of the representative consumer is consistent with the translog form. 
 The generalized Leontief indirect utility function of the representative 
consumer is free of this defect and is modeled as 
(35) 
1
2 2 2
1 1
exp( ) exp( )r r r r rh hj h hj hj h hj
h j h h j h
V Y N a p b pα β α β′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′= ∈ = ∈
 
    = + − + −         
∑ ∑ ∏ ∑ , 
from which we derive the market demand function for each good as 
(36) 
1
2 2
1
exp( )1exp( ) exp( ) .
2 exp( )
r
hj h hjr r r r
hj h h hj h hj h hj h hj r
j h h j h hj h hj
j h
p
x N a p b p
p
α β
β α β β α β
α β′ ′ ′ ′′ ′∈ = ∈ ′ ′
′∈
  
−     = − + −      −       
∑ ∏ ∑ ∑
 
Eq. (36) demonstrates that the demand for a category of goods depends on the 
aggregated price indices of both categories, unlike demand using the translog 
form. Thus, we adopt the generalized Leontief form as the functional form of the 
indirect utility function of the representative consumer. 
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 We implement the estimation in two steps. The first step is to estimate the 
choice probability of the logit model, given the demand for a category. The 
second step is to calculate the aggregated price indices, based on the parameters 
derived in the first step, and then estimate the demand for the categories using the 
aggregated price indices. 
 The first step is identical to the estimation of the logit model for one category 
of goods with the outside option in Section 6.1.1. In the same way as (32), we 
“linearize” the logit model to 
(37) log ( ) ( )
r
hj r r
hj hj h hj hjr
hj
x
p p
x
α α β′ ′
′
= − − − . 
One difference from (32) is that the denominator is not the demand for the outside 
option of “no purchase,” but rather the demand for another good, rhjx ′ .
14 This 
treatment reduces the sample size compared with the logit model for one category 
of goods with the outside option. We again estimate using OLS and 2SLS, using 
the average price in the other stores as the instrument. The results are shown in 
Table 3, where the constant for good 1 is assumed to be zero because only the 
relative size of constants matters in the logit model. All the coefficients are again 
significant at the 1% level using either OLS or 2SLS. The result for endogeneity 
is ambiguous. We reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the 
estimated coefficients using OLS and 2SLS for ketchup, but not for mayonnaise. 
Because we cannot determine which of OLS and 2SLS is a good estimator, we 
conduct the second-step estimation for both cases. 
                                                 
14 For ketchup, we basically use brand 1 as the demand for another good, rhjx ′ , because it is 
the most widely sold. When brand 1 is not sold in a market, we use brand 6. If neither brands 
1 nor 6 are sold, we use brand 3. For mayonnaise, the procedure is the same, such that we use 
brand 7, which is the most widely sold, or brand 1 when brand 7 is unavailable. 
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 The second step is to estimate 
(38) ( )
12
2
1
1
2
r r r r r
h h h h h h
h
X N a P N b Pβ β
=
 
= +  
 
∏ , 
where exp( )r rh hj h hj
j h
P pα β′ ′
′∈
≡ −∑  is the aggregated price index of category h  at 
store r  computed using the first step. We include dummy variables for ha  to 
distinguish the prefectural location in stores,15 taking into account the possibility 
that the demand for ketchup or mayonnaise differs by prefecture, reflecting the 
differences in local dietary habits. Denoting the coefficient of ( )
12
2
1
r
h
h
P
=
∏  by 
1
2
r
h hcoef N bβ≡ , (35) implies a constraint across categories of 
(39) 1 2 2 1 0coef coefβ β− = . 
 We jointly estimate (38) for ketchup and mayonnaise under the constraint of 
(39). However, rhP  might correlate with the error term. Thus, three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) would be a natural candidate for an estimation method. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a good instrument for the aggregated price index 
for each category at each store. The only possibility is to use the average 
aggregated price index in other areas. Denoting the average aggregated price 
index in other areas by rhP
− , we have 
(40) 
682 682
1 1
682 1 681 681
r r r
rh h h
r hr r
h
P P P
PP
′ ′
− ′ ′= =
−
≡ = −
−
∑ ∑
. 
The variation in rhP
−  arises from the second term on the right-hand side, because 
the first term is common to all rhP
− . The first term is far larger than the second 
                                                 
15 If a store in located in Tokyo, all the dummy variables are zero. 
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term, and therefore the average aggregated price index in other areas, rhP
− , is 
almost constant. Thus, 3SLS does not work properly here.16 Therefore, we use 
seemingly unrelated regressions as the estimation method for the second step. We 
then have the two estimation results based on the estimation method in the first 
stage, OLS or 2SLS. Table 4 shows the results. 
 In Table 4, all the coefficients, except for the dummy variables, are significant 
at the 1% level. One reason why the dummy variables for prefectures are not 
significant could be the small sample size for each prefecture. For example, eight 
prefectures (Yamagata, Yamanashi, Shizuoka, Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, 
Kochi, and Oita) only provide two samples each. 
 
6.2. Elasticities 
 We examine the price elasticities of the derived demand functions in Tables 5 
and 6. Note that we have just three different values of elasticities for each case, 
the own-price elasticities, the cross-price elasticities within the same category, 
and the cross-price elasticities across the categories, because the IIA property of 
the logit model makes the cross-price elasticities within the same category equal. 
Tables 5 and 6 report the results arising from the logit model with and without the 
outside option, respectively. Tables 5-1 and 6-1 detail the estimated elasticities in 
the case of OLS, whereas Tables 5-2 and 6-2 show the values in the case of 2SLS. 
In all tables, we present the median of the calculated elasticities for each store. 
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that OLS and 2SLS generally yield a similar profile of 
elasticities. 
                                                 
16 The Chi-square value for the Hausman test is almost zero. 
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 First, we check the results from the logit model with the outside option in 
Tables 5-1 and 5-2.17 Because the demand for each good depends only on the 
choice probability, the cross-price elasticities of a brand of ketchup (mayonnaise) 
with respect to the price of mayonnaise (ketchup) are zero. From (9) and (10), the 
own-price elasticities of the choice probability depend on the market share of 
other goods within a category, and the cross-price elasticities depend on the 
market share of the good concerned. As suggested in Table 1, the choice 
probability for each good is very small if we take into account an outside option. 
In fact, we calculate the choice probability of the outside option, “no purchase,” 
from Table 1 as 99.4% for ketchup and 98.5% for mayonnaise. This implies that 
the market share for other brands is very large whereas that for the brand being 
considered is very small. Thus, the own-price elasticities of the choice probability 
become very large and the cross-price elasticities become very small. Because the 
elasticities of choice probability coincide with the overall price elasticities in the 
logit model with the outside option, the overall own-price elasticities of demand 
are very large, whereas the overall cross-price elasticities are very small. 
 Second, we investigate the results from the logit model without the outside 
option in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. We know that the elasticities of the logit model 
without the outside option differ from those with the outside option in two ways. 
First, the choice probability of each good is larger because there is no outside 
option of “no purchase” within a category. Second, the price elasticities of 
                                                 
17 In Tables 5 and 6, the elasticity indicated by the “own-price” row and the column 
“ 11p “ denotes the own-price elasticity of 11x  to 11p . The elasticity at the “cross-price 1” row 
and column “ 11p “ denotes the within-category cross-price elasticity of 1 jx ′′  ( 2,...,6j′′ = ) 
to 11p . The elasticity at the “cross-price 2” row and column “ 11p “ denotes the across-category 
cross-price elasticity of 2 jx  ( 1,...,8j = ) to 11p . The same applies to the other elasticities. 
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demand for a category exist. For the own-price elasticities, the former effect 
works to make the absolute value of the own-price elasticities smaller, whereas 
the latter effect works in the opposite direction. This is why we do not have a 
clear relationship concerning the relative size of the own elasticities for with and 
without the outside option in our example. For the cross-price elasticities within a 
category, both effects work to make the absolute value of the cross-price 
elasticities larger. Another point to note is that the cross-price elasticity with 
respect to the price of brand 1 of ketchup is very large. This reflects the fact that 
the market share of brand 1 of 47% is much larger than that of the other brands. 
 For the cross-price elasticities across the categories, the results in Tables 6-1 
and 6-2 demonstrate that they are negative. This implies that a brand of ketchup 
and a brand of mayonnaise are gross complements. Thus, our example illustrates a 
situation that is inapplicable to the logit model for one category with the outside 
option. 
 
6.3. Shapes of the demand functions 
 For a better intuitive understanding, we depict the demand functions. We focus 
on the change in the price of brand 1 of ketchup as an example. We fix prices 
other than the price of brand 1 of ketchup at their median values. 
 Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the price and quantity of brand 1 of 
ketchup, i.e., typical demand curves. All the demand curves are smoothly 
downward sloping and the differences are very small. This implies that when 
considering the relationship between own-price and quantity, it does not make 
much difference whether we adopt the logit model for one category with the 
outside option or that for two categories without the outside option. 
 Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the price of brand 1 and the 
quantity of brand 2 of ketchup, i.e., a substitute good within the same category of 
goods. All curves indicate substitutionary relationships. As shown in Section 6.2, 
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in the logit model for one category with the outside option, the unit market share 
of the outside option of “no purchase” is very large, and therefore the unit market 
share of each brand is very small. This makes the cross-elasticities very small. 
Thus, the demand for brand 2 of ketchup is almost unaffected by the price of 
brand 1 of ketchup. On the contrary, in both the logit models for ketchup and 
mayonnaise without an outside option, the cross-elasticities are larger, and the 
depicted curves are more elastic. 
 Figure 3 represents the relationship between the price of brand 1 of ketchup and 
the quantity of brand 1 of mayonnaise, i.e., a brand in the other category of good. 
In the logit model for one category with the outside option, we disregard the 
effect on the other category of goods. Thus, we obtain a vertical line concerning 
their relationship.18 In the logit model for ketchup and mayonnaise without an 
outside option, we instead have downward-sloping curves, which illustrates that 
brand 1 of ketchup and brand 1 of mayonnaise are gross complements. 
 
6.4. Welfare change with the introduction of a new brand 
 We calculate the change in welfare with the introduction of a new brand using 
the example of brand 5 of ketchup and brand 6 of mayonnaise, neither of which 
are sold in Tokyo. We consider a hypothetical situation in which sales commence 
in Tokyo at the national median price and estimate the change in welfare. The 
population of Tokyo is set at 13,296,019, based on the official figure in December 
2013. The results in Table 7 show that the model significantly affects the 
estimated welfare change, such that the change in welfare differs by 15% to 33% , 
                                                 
18 In the logit model for one category with the outside option, the lines depicting the OLS and 
2SLS results overlap because we fix the demands for brands in other categories at their 
median values. 
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depending on whether we use the logit model for one category with the outside 
option or the logit model for two categories without the outside option. 
 In considering the welfare change, we need to focus on two counteracting 
effects. The first is on the cross-elasticities within the same category. In the logit 
model for one category with the outside option, the large market share of the 
outside option implies small absolute values of the cross-elasticities between 
brands. Accordingly, a decrease in the price of one brand results in a relatively 
small decrease in the quantity of other brands within the same category of goods. 
Because the decrease in welfare associated with a decrease in the quantity of other 
brands is small, the welfare change tends to be larger in the logit model for one 
category with the outside option. The second effect is on the cross-elasticities 
across categories of goods. Because the relationship between brands of ketchup 
and brands of mayonnaise is complementary, a decrease in the price of brand 5 of 
ketchup (brand 6 of mayonnaise) increases the demand for all brands of 
mayonnaise (ketchup). This makes the welfare change smaller in the logit model 
for one category with the outside option. 
 We have no clear predetermined results regarding whether the first effect 
dominates the second effect. In our simulation, the first effect dominates the 
second effect concerning the decrease in the price of brand 5 of ketchup, whereas 
the reverse holds regarding the decrease in the price of brand 6 of mayonnaise. 
This arises because of the differences in the size of the cross-elasticities such that 
the absolute values of the cross-elasticities are larger for the demand for ketchup 
in relation to the price of mayonnaise than for the demand for mayonnaise in 
relation to the price of ketchup. Thus, for a decrease in the price of brand 6 of 
mayonnaise, the second effect is sufficiently large to offset the first effect. 
 
32 
 
7. Conclusion 
 This paper develops a utility maximization model that is consistent with the 
results of the logit model but allows the incorporation of multiple categories of 
goods in an unrestrictive way, and examines the characteristics of the derived 
demand functions and a method for welfare estimation. The analysis extends 
naturally to the cases of more general GEV or mixed GEV models. Using POS 
data, we empirically applied the model to the markets for ketchup and 
mayonnaise to suggest that a brand of ketchup is complementary to a brand of 
mayonnaise. Our framework is most useful in describing complementary 
relationships across categories, which are generally intractable in the conventional 
discrete choice models without restrictive assumptions. 
 In concluding the paper, we note four points for future research, mainly from 
the viewpoint of the possibility of more sophisticated empirical analyses. First, 
our framework is equally applicable to person-level data on purchase behavior 
and market-level data. The model in this paper allows a consumer to purchase as 
many brands and goods as they like. If we can estimate the individual demand 
function using person-level data, we can undertake a more accurate demand 
analysis. 
 Second, we exclude behavior on the supply side. A natural direction is to 
extend our analysis to structural analyses including both demand and supply 
behaviors. As Chintagunta and Nair (2011) suggest, it is rather difficult to model 
supply-side behavior for a real-world situation, and incorrect modeling would 
yield significant misspecification bias. However, it would be meaningful to derive 
the implications of the introduction of the supply side by, for example, assuming 
Bertrand competition. 
 Third, we need to be more cautious regarding the possibly of endogeneity. In 
the empirical example in this paper, we use the average prices of other areas as 
instruments, following Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001), as they are the only 
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possible instruments given the limitations of our data. The differences between 
the OLS and 2SLS results are generally minor, partly because the variation in 
instruments is rather limited. Another way to combat endogeneity is to use the 
control function proposed by Petrin and Train (2010). However, even under this 
approach, we need instruments. We need to check the general problem of 
endogeneity in our framework using other data that enable us to use different 
instruments. 
 Finally, the unrealistic implication of the IIA property remains unaddressed in 
our empirical example because our primary aim is to estimate discrete choice 
models that allow multiple categories of goods that can be either substitutes or 
complements. In order to conduct a proper empirical analysis in a more realistic 
context, we need to apply our method to GEV or mixed GEV models that are free 
of the IIA property. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 The demand curve for good 1 in ketchup 
 
 
Figure 2 The relationship between the demand of good 2 in ketchup and the price of good 1 in ketchup 
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Figure 3 The relationship between the demand of good 1 in mayonnaise and the price of good 1 in ketchup 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Good1 Good2 Good3 Good4 Good5 Good6 Good1 Good2 Good3 Good4 Good5 Good6 Good7 Good8
Revenue market share (%) 46.97 5.95 5.94 5.41 3.61 3.15 23.82 15.29 10.15 6.37 5.48 3.41 3.41 3.02
Unit market share (%) Without outside option 47.31 4.88 6.73 4.86 4.22 2.82 24.09 15.20 11.99 6.50 6.20 4.23 3.77 2.96
With outside option 0.39 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.47 0.30 0.23 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.06
Number of Market 673 272 301 588 182 540 645 657 663 618 656 197 669 536
Mean 165 203 170 177 136 189 213 218 194 221 193 165 184 221
Median 165 195 179 176 134 183 213 213 189 227 189 163 183 226
Price (yen) Standard deviation 25 26 38 17 13 32 30 34 41 31 32 19 16 28
Min 100 153 99 141 95 97 134 132 107 126 106 93 122 138
Max 298 284 300 244 189 260 350 341 333 303 265 203 244 333
Mean 278 71 88 33 92 21 349 216 169 98 88 201 53 52
Median 208 42 37 26 73 13 213 213 189 227 189 163 183 226
Standard deviation 244 102 113 26 70 28 398 223 190 181 82 169 44 68
Min 9 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 3 1 2 9 4 2
Max 1714 837 746 212 399 360 3375 1802 1399 1512 408 831 329 576
Quantities sold at
each store
Ketchup Mayonnaise
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Table 2 The logit model with outside option 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Price -0.0194 *** -0.0213 *** -0.0197 *** -0.0197 ***
(0.000502) (0.000541) (0.000286) (0.000297)
Constant Good 1 -2.557 *** -2.231 *** -1.397 *** -1.396 ***
(0.0869) (0.0931) (0.0654) (0.0676)
Good 2 -3.452 *** -3.052 *** -1.838 *** -1.837 ***
(0.110) (0.117) (0.0666) (0.0689)
Good 3 -4.116 *** -3.782 *** -2.584 *** -2.582 ***
(0.0934) (0.0995) (0.0601) (0.0621)
Good 4 -4.421 *** -4.072 *** -2.814 *** -2.813 ***
(0.0930) (0.0996) (0.0677) (0.0700)
Good 5 -4.324 *** -4.056 *** -3.193 *** -3.192 ***
(0.0843) (0.0887) (0.0599) (0.0619)
Good 6 -4.899 *** -4.525 *** -2.84 *** -2.839 ***
(0.0993) (0.106) (0.0637) (0.0650)
Good 7 -3.711 *** -3.71 ***
(0.0574) (0.0593)
Good 8 -3.296 *** -3.295 ***
(0.0682) (0.0705)
Observations 2,556 2,556 4,641 4,641
Hausman Statistics 98.178 0.00893
Ketchup Mayonnaise
 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Table 3 The logit model without outside option 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Price -0.0219 *** -0.0233 *** -0.0181 *** -0.0182 ***
(0.000612) (0.000676) (0.000326) (0.000339)
Constant Good 2 -0.849 *** -0.801 *** 2.28 *** 2.283 ***
(0.0552) (0.0561) (0.0274) (0.0275)
Good 3 -1.475 *** -1.467 *** 1.808 *** 1.812 ***
(0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0290) (0.0292)
Good 4 -1.854 *** -1.837 *** 1.112 *** 1.113 ***
(0.0355) (0.0357) (0.0268) (0.0268)
Good 5 -1.805 *** -1.843 *** 0.83 *** 0.834 ***
(0.0646) (0.0651) (0.0303) (0.0304)
Good 6 -2.303 *** -2.268 *** 0.494 *** 0.495 ***
(0.0392) (0.0398) (0.0270) (0.0270)
Good 7 0.856 *** 0.854 ***
(0.0491) (0.0491)
Good 8 0.333 *** 0.337 ***
(0.0320) (0.0322)
Observations 1,872 1,872 3,922 3,922
Hausman Statistics
Ketchup Mayonnaise
23.592 1.317  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4 Demand functions 
Variable
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
PKetchup 0.09690 *** 0.112*** ***
(0.00857) (0.0105)
PMayonnaise 0.0185 *** 0.0187 ***
(0.000976) (0.000980)
(PKetchupPMayonnaise)
0.5 0.01220 *** 0.0153*** *** 0.0101 *** 0.0120 ***
(0.00212) (0.00235) (0.00175) (0.00184)
Prefecture Dummy Hokkaido 0.01840 *** 0.02430 *** 0.00541 *** 0.00551 ***
(0.00579) (0.00715) (0.00123) (0.00125)
Aomori -0.0115 -0.0118 -0.00429 ** -0.00426 **
(0.0140) (0.0176) (0.00204) (0.00207)
Iwate 0.00279 0.00536 -0.00216 -0.00217
(0.00883) (0.0110) (0.00163) (0.00165)
Miyagi 0.0000236 -0.00181 -0.000445 -0.000526
(0.00698) (0.00850) (0.00148) (0.00151)
Akita -0.03190 * -0.0375 -0.00230 -0.00226
(0.0181) (0.0229) (0.00245) (0.00249)
Yamagata -0.0122 -0.0110 -0.00360 -0.00357
(0.0403) (0.0514) (0.00656) (0.00668)
Fukushima 0.06710 *** 0.09340 *** 0.00674 * 0.00699 *
(0.0242) (0.0313) (0.00352) (0.00359)
Ibaraki 0.000401 0.00555 0.00195 0.00209
(0.0217) (0.0278) (0.00306) (0.00311)
Tochigi -0.0160 -0.0189 -0.00451 -0.00458
(0.0190) (0.0237) (0.00282) (0.00286)
Gunma -0.00842 -0.00837 0.00393 ** 0.00406 **
(0.00858) (0.0107) (0.00163) (0.00166)
Saitama -0.03600 *** -0.04490 *** -0.000550 -0.000577
(0.00670) (0.00821) (0.00136) (0.00138)
Chiba -0.00972 -0.0129 0.00217 0.00219
(0.00939) (0.0115) (0.00194) (0.00197)
Kanagawa -0.02530 *** -0.02990 *** -0.000240 -0.000200
(0.00740) (0.00913) (0.00154) (0.00157)
Niigata 0.0159 0.0227 0.00522 ** 0.00535 **
(0.0117) (0.0146) (0.00256) (0.00260)
Toyama -0.05240 *** -0.06620 *** -0.00628 *** -0.00642 ***
(0.00890) (0.0107) (0.00182) (0.00185)
Ishikawa -0.00979 -0.0145 -0.00513 *** -0.00519 ***
(0.00976) (0.0118) (0.00172) (0.00174)
Fukui -0.0144 -0.0168 -0.000958 -0.000952
(0.00978) (0.0121) (0.00189) (0.00192)
Yamanashi 0.20700 ** 0.25400 ** 0.02420 *** 0.02480 ***
(0.0845) (0.105) (0.00468) (0.00476)
Nagano -0.04340 *** -0.05210 *** -0.000368 -0.000401
(0.00836) (0.0103) (0.00218) (0.00222)
Gifu 0.00571 0.00660 0.00208 0.00214
(0.0170) (0.0212) (0.00221) (0.00224)
Shizuoka 0.00378 0.0109 0.000467 0.000539
(0.0583) (0.0745) (0.0120) (0.0122)
Ketchup Mayonnaise
 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 4 Continued 
Aichi -0.00826 -0.00874 -0.000464 -0.000395
(0.00904) (0.0113) (0.00138) (0.00140)
Mie -0.05950 *** -0.07520 *** -0.00552 *** -0.00564 ***
(0.0104) (0.0125) (0.00182) (0.00185)
Kyoto -0.0752 -0.0913 0.00177 0.00202
(0.0549) (0.0716) (0.00487) (0.00496)
Osaka -0.03120 *** -0.03890 *** -0.000466 -0.000468
(0.00735) (0.00898) (0.00141) (0.00143)
Hyogo -0.01800 *** -0.02170 * -0.000703 -0.000688
(0.0101) (0.0125) (0.00184) (0.00187)
Nara -0.0112 -0.0142 0.00265 0.00272
(0.0182) (0.0224) (0.00336) (0.00342)
Wakayama -0.0178 -0.0189 -0.000238 -0.000201
(0.0157) (0.0197) (0.00373) (0.00379)
Shimane 0.0349 0.0526 0.00614 ** 0.00636 **
(0.0255) (0.0331) (0.00281) (0.00286)
Okayama -0.05350 *** -0.06550 *** -0.000816 -0.000854
(0.00908) (0.0111) (0.00218) (0.00222)
Hiroshima -0.02670 ** -0.03190 ** -0.00534 *** -0.00537 ***
(0.0111) (0.0139) (0.00156) (0.00158)
Yamaguchi 0.0319* 0.0428* 0.00801 ** 0.00821 **
(0.0177) (0.0222) (0.00370) (0.00376)
Tokushima 0.0641 0.0852 0.01280 ** 0.01310 **
(0.0461) (0.0588) (0.00550) (0.00559)
Kagawa 0.0391 0.0534 0.00722 0.00748
(0.0440) (0.0560) (0.00632) (0.00644)
Ehime 0.0170 0.0231 0.00289 0.00300
(0.0369) (0.0465) (0.00516) (0.00524)
Kochi -0.0203 -0.0216 0.00346 0.00364
(0.0441) (0.0562) (0.00681) (0.00693)
Fukuoka -0.02250 *** -0.03370 *** -0.00124 -0.00138
(0.00567) (0.00681) (0.00107) (0.00109)
Saga -0.03290 *** -0.04570 *** 0.01370 *** 0.01380 ***
(0.0114) (0.0137) (0.00181) (0.00183)
Nagasaki -0.00534 -0.0110 0.01730 *** 0.01750 ***
(0.0108) (0.0130) (0.00183) (0.00185)
Kumamoto -0.00562 -0.0151 0.02080 *** 0.02080 ***
(0.0125) (0.0149) (0.00196) (0.00198)
Oita -0.0194 -0.03180 ** 0.02040 *** 0.02050 ***
(0.0135) (0.0158) (0.00199) (0.00201)
Miyazaki -0.04800 *** -0.05890 *** 0.00145 0.00151
(0.0145) (0.0179) (0.00236) (0.00239)
Kagoshima -0.0167 -0.0169 0.000723 0.000856
(0.0436) (0.0565) (0.00382) (0.00388)
Observations 682 682 682 682  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 5-1 Elasticities for the logit model with one category with outside option-OLS 
p 11 p 12 p 13 p 14 p 15 p 16 p 21 p 22 p 23 p 24 p 25 p 26 p 27 p 28
Own Price -3.1798 -3.7756 -3.4645 -3.4081 -2.5989 -3.5346 -4.1722 -4.1934 -3.7100 -4.4630 -3.7207 -3.1959 -3.6175 -4.4566
Cross Price 1 0.0101 0.0027 0.0018 0.0014 0.0025 0.0008 0.0156 0.0099 0.0068 0.0030 0.0036 0.0075 0.0023 0.0019
Cross Price 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Price
Type of
elasticities
 
Own Price: own price elasticities, Cross Price 1: cross price elasticities within the same category, Cross Price 2: cross price elasticities across the 
categories 
 
Table 5-2 Elasticities for the logit model with one category with outside option-2SLS 
p 11 p 12 p 13 p 14 p 15 p 16 p 21 p 22 p 23 p 24 p 25 p 26 p 27 p 28
Own Price -3.5038 -4.1602 -3.8175 -3.7554 -2.8637 -3.8947 -4.1738 -4.1951 -3.7115 -4.4648 -3.7222 -3.1971 -3.6189 -4.4583
Cross Price 1 0.0112 0.0031 0.0019 0.0015 0.0028 0.0009 0.0156 0.0099 0.0068 0.0030 0.0036 0.0075 0.0023 0.0019
Cross Price 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Price
Type of
elasticities
 
 
Table 6-1 Elasticities for the logit model with multiple category without outside option-OLS in the first stage 
p 11 p 12 p 13 p 14 p 15 p 16 p 21 p 22 p 23 p 24 p 25 p 26 p 27 p 28
Own Price -3.2223 -4.1862 -3.8399 -3.7705 -2.8875 -3.9736 -3.7719 -3.8188 -3.3715 -4.0900 -3.4152 -2.9199 -3.3188 -4.0907
Cross Price 1 0.4000 0.0942 0.0852 0.0498 0.0849 0.0252 0.0747 0.0444 0.0306 0.0160 0.0164 0.0310 0.0115 0.0100
Cross Price 2 -0.1594 -0.0367 -0.0333 -0.0206 -0.0348 -0.0103 -0.2619 -0.1558 -0.1029 -0.0518 -0.0540 -0.0948 -0.0367 -0.0309
Price
Type of
elasticities
 
 
Table 6-2 Elasticities for the logit model with multiple category without outside option-2SLS in the first stage 
p 11 p 12 p 13 p 14 p 15 p 16 p 21 p 22 p 23 p 24 p 25 p 26 p 27 p 28
Own Price -3.3625 -4.4410 -4.0711 -3.9935 -3.0619 -4.2205 -3.7896 -3.8382 -3.3894 -4.1131 -3.4348 -2.9354 -3.3374 -4.1138
Cross Price 1 0.4782 0.1119 0.1012 0.0594 0.1015 0.0301 0.0797 0.0473 0.0325 0.0171 0.0174 0.0330 0.0123 0.0108
Cross Price 2 -0.1791 -0.0411 -0.0374 -0.0232 -0.0389 -0.0117 -0.3041 -0.1803 -0.1193 -0.0602 -0.0625 -0.1100 -0.0426 -0.0359
Price
Type of
elasticities
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Table 7 Welfare change by an introduction of good 5 in ketchup or good 6 in mayonnaise 
p 15 p 26
OLS 0.6710 1.5816
IV 0.6107 1.5810
OLS 0.6065 2.0428
IV 0.5217 2.0992
OLS 90 129
IV 85 133
Price
Change in CV
(million yen)
Ratio (%)
Single category with
outside option (a)
Multiple categories (b)
b/a
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Appendix A. List of variables and parameters 
jx  demand for differentiated good j   
jp  price of differentiated good j  ( 1,...,j M= ) 
y  a consumer’s income 
gx  total demand for a choice set 
P  aggregate price index 
js  choice probability of differentiated good j  
v   indirect utility function of a consumer 
( )j yα  alternative-specific parameter 
( )yβ  common coefficient of jp  
u   direct utility function of a consumer 
a   parameter in the direct utility function of (7) 
jθ  elasticity of gx  with respect to jp  
cv  compensating variation 
e   expenditure function 
c
jx  compensated demand for differentiated good j  
c
gx  compensated total demand for a choice set 
LS  log-sum term for the logit model 
hP  aggregate price index for category h  
hp  price vector for differentiated goods that belong to category h  ( 1,...,h H= ) 
hLS  log-sum term for category h   
hjx  demand for differentiated good j  in category h  
hjp  price of differentiated good j  in category h  
hgx  total demand for category h  
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hjs  choice probability for differentiated good j  within category h  
hβ  a common coefficient of kp  for category h  ( k h∈ ) 
hjθ  elasticity of hgx  with respect to jp  
c
hgx  compensated total demand for category h  
V  indirect utility function of the representative consumer 
Y  aggregated income across consumers 
 
Appendix B. The necessary conditions for the demand function for 
differentiated good   to have the form of (2) 
 From (2) and Roy’s Identity, the indirect utility function must satisfy: 
(B.1) 11
1 1
1 1
( ,..., , ) ...exp( ( , )) exp( ( , ))
exp( ( , )) exp( ( , ))
M
g M
M M
M M
j j j j
j j
v v
p px p p y p y p yv v
y yp y p y
φ φ
φ φ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′= =
∂ ∂
− −
∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂
∂ ∂∑ ∑
. 
We first consider the case of 2M = . From the second and last equations of (B.1), 
we have 
(B.2) 
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 0
exp( ( , )) exp( ( , ))
v v
p y p p y pφ φ
− ∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂
. 
The solution of (B.2) can be derived by solving the system of equations (e.g., 
Zachmanoglou and Thoe (1986)): 
(B.3) 1 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 0 0
exp( ( , )) exp( ( , ))
dp dp dy dv
p y p yφ φ
= = =
−
. 
The third and fourth equations of (B.3) immediately implies 0dy dv= = , from 
which we obtain:  
(B.4) 1y C=  and 
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(B.5) 2v C= , 
where 1C  and 2C  are constants. In the following, lC  denotes constant. The first 
and second equations of (B.3) is rewritten as 
(B.6) 1 1 1 2 2 2exp( ( , )) exp( ( , )) 0p y dp p y dpφ φ+ = . 
Solving (B.6) regarding 1p  and 2p , noting that y  is constant from (B.4), we 
obtain: 
(B.7) 
2
3
1
1exp( ( , ))j j
jj
j
p y C
p
φ
φ′ ′ ′′=
′
=
∂
∂
∑ , 
where j
jp
φ∂
∂
 is a constant that does not depend on jp . This immediately implies 
that j
jp
φ∂
∂
 is linear in jp . 
 We have the two cases to consider: 1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
≠
∂ ∂
 and 1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
. In the case of 
1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
≠
∂ ∂
, we have 
(B.8) ( ) ( )j j j jy y pφ α β= − . 
Substituting (B.8) into (B.7) yields 
(B.9) 
2
3
1
1exp( ( ) ( ) )
( )j j jj j
y y p C
y
α β
β′ ′ ′′= ′
− =∑ . 
From (B.4), (B.5), and (B.9), the solution of (B.3) is: 
(B.10) 
2
1
1, , exp( ( ) ( ) ) 0
( )j j jj j
f y v y y p
y
α β
β′ ′ ′′= ′
 
− =  
 
∑ . 
Solving (B.10) regarding v  yields: 
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(B.11) 
2
1
1exp( ( ) ( ) ) ,
( )j j jj j
v v y y p y
y
α β
β′ ′ ′′= ′
 
= −  
 
∑ . 
Substituting (B.11) into the second equation of (B.1), we derive: 
(B.12) 
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
exp( ( ) ( ) )exp( ( ) ( ) )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
M
j j j
j
M
j j j
j
vv y y py y p PP
y y p v v
y yy y p
α βα β
α β
α β
′ ′ ′
′=
′ ′ ′
′=
∂∂ − −− − ∂∂ =
− ∂ ∂
∂ ∂−
∑
∑

 , 
where 
2
1
1exp( ( ) ( ) )
( )j j jj j
P y y p
y
α β
β′ ′ ′′= ′
≡ −∑  is the aggregated price index. Eq. 
(B.12) demonstrates that the demand for a category, gx , depends on 
1
exp( ( ) ( ) )
M
j j j
j
y y pα β′ ′ ′
′=
−∑ , as well as the aggregated price index, P , and income, 
y , although the first equation of (B.1) requires that gx  depends only on P  and y . 
(Note that 
1
exp( ( ) ( ) )
M
j j j
j
y y pα β′ ′ ′
′=
−∑  cannot be represented as the function of P .) 
In conclusion, the case of 1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
≠
∂ ∂
 is not consistent with (B.1). 
 In the case of 1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
, ( )j yβ  does not depend on j . Thus, using (B.4), 
(B.9) can be rewritten as 
(B.13) 
2
3 1 3 4
1
exp( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )j j
j
y y p y C C C Cα β β β′ ′
′=
− = = ≡∑ . 
From (B.4), (B.5), and (B.13), the solution of (B.3) is: 
(B.14) 
2
1
, , exp( ( ) ( ) ) 0j j
j
f y v y y pα β′ ′
′=
 
− = 
 
∑ . 
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Solving (B.14) regarding v  yields (3) and (4) in the case of 2M = . ( ) 0yβ >  
follows from 0j
j
s
p
∂
<
∂
. 
 We then consider the case of 3M = . Solving (B.2) in the same manner as the 
case of 2M = , we have the two cases to consider: 1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
≠
∂ ∂
 and 1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
. We 
can exclude the case of 1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
≠
∂ ∂
, as is the case with 2M = . Thus, we have 
1 2
1 2p p
φ φ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
, which yields a counterpart of (B.10): 
(B.15) 
2
3
1
1, , , exp( ( ) ( ) ) 0
( ) j jj
g y v p y y p
y
α β
β ′ ′′=
 
− = 
 
∑ . 
Solving (B.15) regarding v  yields 
(B.16) 
2
3
1
1, , exp( ( ) ( ) )
( ) j jj
v g y p y y p
y
α β
β ′ ′′=
 
= − 
 
∑ . 
In the case of 3M = , we also have the relationship of 
(B.17) 
1 1 1 3 3 3
1 1 0
exp( ( ) ( ) ) exp( ( , ))
v v
y y p p p y pα β φ
− ∂ ∂
+ =
− ∂ ∂
 
Substituting (B.16) into (B.17), we derive 
(B.18) 
2
3 3 3
1
1 0
exp( ( , ))1 exp( ( ) ( ) )
( ) j jj
g g
p y p
y y p
y
φ
α β
β ′ ′′=
∂ ∂
+ =
∂ 
∂ − 
 
∑
 
. 
 The solution of (B.18) can be derived by solving the system of equations:  
(B.19) 
2
3
1
3 3
1 exp( ( ) ( ) ) 1( ) 0 0
exp( ( , ))
j j
j
dp dy dvd y y p
y
p y
α β
β
φ
′ ′
′=
 
− = = = 
 
∑ . 
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The third and fourth equations of (B.19) imply 0dy dv= = . In the same way as 
(B.4) and (B.5), we obtain: 
(B.20) 5y C=  and 
(B.21) 6v C= . 
Solving (B.19) regarding the two left equations, noting that y  is constant from 
(B.20), we obtain:  
(B.22) 
2
3 3
7
31
3
1 exp( ( , ))exp( ( ) ( ) )
( ) j jj
p yy y p C
y
p
φα β φβ ′ ′′=
− − =
∂
∂
∑ , 
where 3
3p
φ∂
∂
 is a constant that does not depend on 3p . This immediately implies 
that 3
3p
φ∂
∂
 is linear in jp . Noting that 1 2 3
1 2 3p p p
φ φ φ∂ ∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂ ∂
 in the same way as 2M = , 
we can write 3φ  as 
(B.23) 3 3 3( ) ( )y y pφ α β= − . 
Substituting (B.23) into (B.22) yields 
(B.24) 
3
7 5 7 8
1
exp( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )j j
j
y y p y C C C Cα β β β′ ′
′=
− = = ≡∑ . 
From (B.20), (B.21), and (B.24), the solution of (B.19) is: 
(B.25) 
3
1
, , exp( ( ) ( ) ) 0j j
j
h y v y y pα β′ ′
′=
 
− = 
 
∑  
Solving (B.25) regarding v  yields (3) and (4) in the case of 3M = . The same 
method applies to the proof for the case of 4M ≥ . 
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Appendix C. The GEV model 
 From McFadden (1978: Theorem 1), the GEV model can be described by using 
the function 1( , , )MF µ µ , where exp( ( , ))j j jp yµ φ≡ . 
(GEV-1) 1( , , )MF µ µ  is nonnegative. 
(GEV-2) 1( , , )MF µ µ  is homogeneous of degree ς .
19 
(GEV-3) 1lim ( , , )jz MF µ µ→∞ = ∞ . 
(GEV-4) The κ -th order partial derivative of 1( , , )MF µ µ  with respect to any 
combination of distinct jµ  is nonnegative if κ  is odd and nonpositive if κ  is 
even. That is, 0
j
F
µ
∂
≥
∂
 for all j , 
2
0
j j
F
µ µ ′
∂
≤
∂ ∂
 for all 1,...,j M′ =  and j j′ ≠ , 
3
0
j j j
F
µ µ µ′ ′′
∂
≥
∂ ∂ ∂
 for any distinct j , j′ , and j′′  ( 1,...,j M′′ = ), and so on for 
higher-order derivatives. 
 Under assumptions (GEV-1) to (GEV-4), from McFadden (1978: Theorem 1), 
the choice probability for differentiated good j  is: 
(C.1) 1( ,..., , )
j
j
GEVj M
F
s p p y
F
µ
µ
ς
∂
∂
= . 
 Extending the analysis in Sections 2 to the GEV model is straightforward. The 
points to note are as follows. 
i) The aggregated price index in the case of one category is modified from (4) to: 
(C.2) 1 1(exp( ( ) ( ) ), , exp( ( ) ( ) ))GEV M MP F y y p y y pα β α β≡ − − . 
                                                 
19 McFadden (1978: Theorem 1) assumed homogeneity of degree one. Ben-Akiva and 
Francois (1983) demonstrate that H  can be homogeneous of degree ς . See also Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman (1985: p. 126). 
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ii) The choice probability for differentiated good j  is modified from (6) to: 
(C.3) 1
exp( ( ) ( ) )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
( ,..., , )
j j
j j
GEVj M
F y y p
y y p
s p p y
F
α β
α β
ς
∂
−
∂ −
= . 
The argument of exponential function is ( ) ( )j jy y pα β− , which is linear in price 
and has the same coefficient for price. 
iii) As is the same with the logit model, we cannot derive the direct utility 
function that perfectly corresponds to the GEV model in a closed form. Verboven 
(1996) derives an example of direct utility function that corresponds to the nested 
logit model, which is a special class of the GEV model. 
iv) Regarding the elasticities, the essence remains unchanged: for the GEV 
model, we add the elasticities of total demand to the standard own- and cross-
price elasticities when the total demand is endogenous. The own-price elasticity 
of differentiated good j  is modified from (9) to: 
(C.4) (1 )j j j GEVj j jj
j j
x p
s p
p x
θ β ς η
∂
= − − +
∂
, 
where j jjj
j
j
F
p
p F
µ
η
µ
 ∂
∂   ∂ ≡
∂  ∂
  ∂ 
 is the elasticity of 
j
F
µ
∂
∂
 with respect to the price of 
differentiated good j , jp . The cross-price elasticity is modified from (10) to: 
(C.5) j k k GEVk k jk
k j
x p s p
p x
θ βς η
∂
= + +
∂
, 
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where 
2
( ) 0j k kjk k
k j k
j j
F
p pFy
p F F
µ
η β µ
µ µ
µ µ
 ∂
∂   ∂ ∂ ≡ = − ≥
∂ ∂ ∂   ∂ ∂
      ∂ ∂   
. The cross-price 
elasticity can be negative when the elasticity of total demand is taken into account. 
Note that the cross-elasticity is always positive, if the elasticity of total demand 
for a choice set is not taken into account. 
v) Welfare analysis is the same as that for the logit model, except that the 
aggregated price index and the log-sum term is modified from (4) and (16) to 
(C.2) and 
(C.6) 1 1ln ln (exp( ( ) ( ) ), , exp( ( ) ( ) ))GEV GEV M MLS P F y y p y y pα β α β≡ = − − . 
vi) Extending to the case of multiple categories of differentiated goods and 
many consumers in the GEV model is totally analogous to the analysis of the logit 
model in Sections 3 and 4. 
 
Appendix D. The mixed logit model 
 Following Train (2009: pp. 134–137), the mixed logit model is a model that has 
the following choice probability: 
(D.1) 1( ,..., , ( ), ) ( ) ,MLj j Ms s p p y f d
γ
γ γ γ γ= ∫  
where γ  is the consumer’s parameter, ( )y γ  is the consumer’s income that has the 
parameter of γ , ( )f γ  is a probability density function of γ , and 
1( ,..., , ( ), )j Ms p p y γ γ  is the logit-type choice probability for a consumer with the 
parameter γ . 
In (D.1), we allow for heterogeneity not only in consumer income, ( )y γ , but also 
in the parameter, γ . 
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 Extending this definition to include endogenous total demand, we define the 
mixed logit model as the model in which the expected demand function of 
differentiated good j  has the form of: 
(D.2) 
1 1
1
( ) ( ,..., , ( ), ) ( ,..., , ( ), ) ( )
( ,..., , ( ), ) ( ) ,
j g M j M
j M
E x x p p y s p p y f d
x p p y f d
γ
γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
=
=
∫
∫
 
where ( )jE x  is the consumer’s expected demand function for differentiated good 
j . 
 Applying the analysis in Sections 2 to the mixed logit model is straightforward. 
The points to note are as follows. 
i) A consumer’s expected indirect utility function has the form of: 
(D.3) 1( ) ( ( ,..., , ( ), ), ( ), ) ( )ME v v P p p y y f d
γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ= ∫ , 
where 
(D.4) 1
1
( ,..., , ( ), ) exp( ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) )
M
M j j
j
P p p y y y pγ γ α γ γ β γ γ′ ′
′=
≡ −∑ . 
ii) The expected demand function of differentiated good j  has the form of (D.2), 
where: 
(D.5)
 1 1
( ( ), )
( ,..., , ( ), ) ( ( ,..., , ( ), ), ( ), )
( )
g M g M
vy P
Px p p y x P p p y y v
y
β γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ
∂
∂= =
∂
∂
 
and 
(D.6) 1
1
exp( ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) )
( ,..., , ( ), )
exp( ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) )
j j
j M M
j j
j
y y p
s p p y
y y p
α γ γ β γ γ
γ γ
α γ γ β γ γ′ ′
′=
−
=
−∑
. 
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As is the case with the logit model, (D.6) implies that the argument of exponential 
function is linear in price and has the same coefficient for price. 
iii) The consumer’s expected own- and cross-price elasticities with respect to the 
price of differentiated good j , jp , are respectively: 
(D.7) ( )( ) ( ( ), )(1 ) ( )
( ) ( )
j j g j
j j j
j j j
E x p x s
y s p f d
p E x E xγ
θ β γ γ γ γ
 ∂  = − − 
∂   
∫ , 
and 
(D.8) ( )
( )
( ( ), ) ( )
( ) ( )
j g jk
k k k
k j j
E x x sp y s p f d
p E x E xγ
θ β γ γ γ γ
 ∂  = + 
∂   
∫ . 
 When the total demand for a choice set is endogenous, we add the price 
elasticity of total demand, as in the logit model. This can make the cross-price 
elasticity positive in the mixed logit model. A change in total demand is necessary 
to represent the gross-complementary relationship between differentiated goods, 
although the mixed logit model can deal with complex substitutionary patterns. 
For example, the IIA property, which is a feature of the logit model, does not hold 
because the cross-price elasticities in (D.7) depend on 
( )
g j
j
x s
E x
, which differs 
across differentiated goods. 
iv) The consumer’s expected compensating variation, ( )E cv , generally can be 
written as: 
(D.9) 1
1
( ) ( ,..., , ( ), ) ( )
WO
j
W
j
Mp jc WO
j Mp
j j
p
E cv x p p v dp f d
pγ
γ γ γ γ′′
′=
  ∂
=     ∂  
∑∫ ∫ . 
If the aggregate price index, (D.5), is independent of income, we can calculate the 
consumer’s expected compensating variation using the aggregated price index or 
the log-sum term: 
56 
 
(D.10)
 
1
1
( ,..., , ) 1
1( ,..., , )
1
( ( ,..., , ), ( ), )1( ) ( ,..., , ) ( )
( ( ), ) ( ,..., , )
WO
ML M
W
ML M
c WO
P p p g M
MP p p
M
x P p p v
E cv dP p p f d
y P p p
γ
γ
γ
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
β γ γ γ
 
= − 
 
∫ ∫
 
(D.11)  
1
1
( ,..., , )
1 1( ,..., , )
1( ) ( ( ,..., , ), ( ), ) ( ,..., , ) ( )
( ( ), )
WO
ML M
W
ML M
LS p p c WO
g M MLS p p
E cv x P p p v dLS p p f d
y
γ
γ
γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
β γ γ
 
= − 
 
∫ ∫
. 
 
Eqs. (D.9)-(D.11) respectively are the expected values of the second equation of 
(11), (15), and (17) concerning γ . 
v) We can straightforwardly extend the above analysis to cases of multiple 
categories of differentiated goods. 
vi) In the mixed logit model with multiple consumers, we derive a different result 
from the logit model regarding the form of the expected indirect utility function. 
As is the same with the analysis for the logit model in Section 4, the aggregated 
price index must be independent of income to take the Gorman form in the case of 
a multiple-consumer economy. In addition, the coefficient of income needs to be 
common among consumers; this implies that the coefficient of income cannot 
depend on the aggregated price index, which is a function of γ . These restrictions 
make consumer i ’s expected indirect utility function the quasilinear form, which 
is a special form of the Gorman form: 
(D.12) ( )1( ) ( ( ,..., , ), ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i i i i i i i
ME v A P p p By f d
γ
γ γ γ γ γ= +∫ , 
where B  is a constant. As a result, the compensating variation, the equivalent 
variation, and a change in consumers’ surpluses coincide. 
vii) The above analysis on the mixed logit model can be generalized to the 
analysis on the mixed GEV model, applying Appendix B. 
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Appendix E. The brand name of the goods 
Ketchup 
 Good 1: Kagome tomato ketchup tube 500g 
 Good 2: Delmonte tomato ketchup value bottle 800g 
 Good 3: Delmonte tomato ketchup tube 500g 
 Good 4: Kagome tomato ketchup tube 300g 
 Good 5: CGC tomato ketchup 500g 
 Good 6: Heintz tomato ketchup reverse bottle 460g 
Mayonnaise 
 Good 1: Kewpie mayonnaise 450g 
 Good 2: Kewpie Kewpie half 400g 
 Good 3: Ajinomoto pure select mayonnaise 400g 
 Good 4: Kewpie mayonnaise 350g 
 Good 5: Ajinomoto pure select koku-uma 65% calorie cut 360g 
 Good 6: CGC mayonnaise 500g 
 Good 7: Kewpie tartar sauce 155g 
 Good 8: Kewpie Kewpie half 300g 
